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Abstract. A large number of safety-critical control systems are based on N-
modular redundant architectures, using majority voters on the outputs of 
independent computation units. In order to assess the compliance of these 
architectures with international safety standards, the frequency of hazardous 
failures must be analyzed by developing and solving proper formal models. 
Furthermore, the impact of maintenance faults has to be considered, since 
imperfect maintenance may degrade the safety integrity level of the system. In 
this paper we present both a failure model for voting architectures based on 
Bayesian Networks and a maintenance model based on Continuous Time 
Markov Chains, and we propose to combine them according to a compositional 
multiformalism modeling approach in order to analyze the impact of imperfect 
maintenance on the system safety. We also show how the proposed approach 
promotes the reuse and the interchange of models as well the interchange of 
solving tools. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Safety-critical computer systems (e.g. the ones used in hard real-time control 
applications) are often based on N-modular redundant architectures, using majority 
voters on the outputs of independent computation units. In order to assess the 
compliance of these architectures with international safety standards, the probability 
of the occurrence of unsafe events should be evaluated by developing and analyzing 
proper formal models. At this aim modeling languages for dependability evaluation 
such as Fault Trees and Stochastic Petri Nets have been widely used. A different 
approach is proposed in [16], where a Bayesian Network (BN) model is developed to 
evaluate the Mean Time Between Hazardous Events (MTBHE) of “2 out of 2” 
(“2oo2”) voting architectures used in railway control applications in place of a 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) model of the same system presented in [2]. 
The goal of that work was to point out that Bayesian Networks (more in general non 
state-based approaches) may be effectively used if the safety analysis can be 
performed by pure probabilistic techniques. This requires defining preconditions (i.e. 
constraints) or presumptions on vulnerability and failure mechanisms. Specifically, 
safe assumptions on fault/error latencies may be made on the voting architecture, 
provided that the result of the analysis is compliant with the safety requirements. In 
these cases, the BN model has several advantages over state-based models. 
It is sometimes required by the safety assessors to evaluate the impact of maintenance 
faults (mainly due to human errors) on the safety integrity level of the system. 
Therefore, in this paper we extend the work presented in [16] to take into account 
imperfect maintenance. Since state-based approaches are usually needed when 
maintainability aspects must be explicitly addressed [14], here we propose a 
multiformalism approach which allows to develop two different independent models, 
a maintenance model and a failure-model,  and combine them to analyze the impact of 
maintenance faults on the system integrity level. By separating the maintenance 
model and the failure model, it is possible to use different modeling languages, so that 
the failure model can be expressed by means of Bayesian Networks (if it is the case), 
and the maintenance model can be expressed by means of state-based formalisms. At 
the same time, the two models can be composed in order to obtain a multiformalism 
model allowing the two models to interact with each other. By properly defining the 
semantics of the composition and the interface of the models, the proposed approach 
promotes flexibility and model reuse (e.g. the failure model may be easily substituted 
by a state-based one whenever necessary, or the maintenance model may be 
substituted by another one if a more efficient solution technique or analysis tool is 
available). 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some related works; Section 3 
describes the reference architecture and the events that may cause hazardous failures; 
Section 4 synthesizes the model and the results presented in [16], Section 5 introduces 
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imperfect maintenance and several maintenance models based on Continuous Time 
Markov Chains; Section 6 presents a multiformalism composed model accounting for 
imperfect maintenance and provides an example of evaluation of such model; finally, 
Section 7 contains conclusions and  some hints about future work. 
2. Related works 
An introduction to the dependability of computer systems, including safety related 
aspects and a reference taxonomy, is provided by Avizienis at al. [3]. In the study 
reported in [2] the MTBHE of “2oo2” redundant architectures is evaluated by means 
of a GSPN model. In the same work it is shown how the result can be easily used for 
the safety evaluation of “2 out of 3” (“2oo3”) architectures, which are widely 
employed in control applications and better known as Triple Modular Redundancy 
(TMR). The analysis of TMR systems ha been addressed by means of model-based 
studies on the hazardous failure rate using Markov Chains in the works of Hyunki et 
al. [19] and DeLong et al. [11], the latter focusing on safety related metrics. 
As an alternative to the traditional Markov Chains models, Dynamic Fault Trees 
(DFT) [13] have also been introduced as a flexible and easy to use formalism for 
dependability modeling of TMR systems. DFT extends the Fault Tree formalism, 
which is only combinatorial, by adding state-based features. Repairable Fault Trees 
(RFT) [10] can be also used to model behavioral aspects of reliability when the focus 
is on system’s maintenance [14]. In spite of the increased expressive power, both DFT 
and RFT feature the drawback of a lower solving efficiency, due to the required state-
based analysis. 
With the aim to overcome some of the efficiency limitations of the state-based 
formalisms, the application of Bayesian Networks to reliability modeling has been 
introduced by Portinale et al. [24]. A comparison of the efficiency of different 
(probabilistic) techniques for safety and dependability assessment can be found in 
reference [5], where it is underlined the tradeoff between expressive power and 
solving efficiency offered by BNs versus Fault Trees and GSPNs. Basing on the 
results of the aforementioned works, a study on multiformalism reliability evaluation 
of a complex railway control system based on Fault Trees and Bayesian Networks has 
been performed by the same authors of this paper [15]. The study applies to a real-
world complex case-study the theoretical results provided in the previous works, 
highlighting some of the advantages of multiformalism modeling. 
Imperfect maintenance of TMR systems is addressed in its general terms in [29], 
where both preventive and corrective (i.e. post failure) maintenance are considered. 
However, in such work it is assumed that corrective maintenance always renews the 
system and only preventive maintenance can be imperfect. Furthermore, the study is 
focused on system availability and does not consider safety related issues. Also the 
work reported in [18] focuses on preventive maintenance to avoid system 
deterioration. In this work Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets are used to represent and 
analyse the model. Even though related to safety-critical computer architectures, it 
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seems that none of the existing works evaluates the impact of imperfect corrective 
maintenance (due to human or non-human factors) on system safety. 
To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this paper is the first study 
addressing multiformalism modeling in order to cope with imperfect maintenance in 
the safety analysis of voting architectures. 
3. System description 
Safety-critical systems must be compliant to international standards defining 
quantitative requirements on the Hazardous Failure Rate (HFR). One of these 
standards is the CENELEC 50129 [7], from which requirements of more specific 
safety specifications (e.g. ERTMS/ETCS [27]) are derived. Functional safety is 
assessed by means of qualitative approaches aimed at defining system functional 
safety requirements (e.g. Failure Mode & Effect Analysis, Hazard Analysis [12]) and 
allocating Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) to subsystems according to their criticality. 
More specifically, for the maximum level of safety criticality (SIL-4), Table A.1 of 
reference [7] (Section A.5.2) specifies the following quantitative requirement on the 
Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR): 10-9 ≤ THR < 10–8. In order to fulfill such requirement, 
the usage of redundancy and majority voting techniques is widely adopted in 
implementing safety nucleuses. This reduces the chances of propagation of hardware 
faults till the application software layer and therefore the risk of catastrophic system 
failures.  
A schematic representation of a TMR architecture is shown in Figure 1. TMR is a 
well known technique based on majority voting currently adopted to implement the 
safety nucleus of most critical control systems. It is based on three independent 
computing subsystems (or “units”) whose output is voted according to a “2oo3” 
scheme. Exclusion logic units are external fail-safe devices used to shut-down a failed 
unit, that is the unit which is not agreeing with the remaining two. When a single unit 
fails it is excluded and the system continues to operate by relying on two units 
according to a “2oo2” voting scheme. 
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Figure 1. A Triple Modular Redundant architecture. 
 
The complete independence of the three units is guaranteed by hardware fault-
prevention and fault-tolerance techniques (e.g. galvanic isolation and fiber-optics 
based communication facilities). At the software level, redundancy codes, design 
diversity and consistency checks are employed, together with test and diagnostic 
processes. Furthermore, software errors are always considered as systematic in safety-
critical systems and therefore they are not quantifiable, as also stated by the reference 
standard [7]. Thus, the dependability model of these architectures may not take into 
account common mode of failures. However, the modeling technique presented in this 
paper also allows to easily evaluate the impact of fault correlation on the hazardous 
failure rate, whenever required, though this aspect is out of the scope of this work. 
The qualitative Fault Tree depicted in Figure 2 represents five paths of events 
leading to the occurrence of a hazardous failure, namely: 
1. fault in the voter which affects the output; 
2. simultaneously occurrence of a wrong output of one faulty unit and a voter 
failure in detecting unmatching outputs; 
3. undetected invalid inputs to both units; 
4. undetected invalid outputs from both units; 
5. combined activation of two latent errors. 
Given the real system architecture [2], paths 1 and 3 can be neglected. As for path 1, 
while in the logical scheme of Figure 1 the voter is represented as a separate unit, in 
most real implementations a distributed software voting is adopted. Therefore, voter 
failure is already considered in paths 4 and 5. As for path 3, the correctness of inputs 
is assured by external mechanisms (e.g. redundancy codes) which are not in the scope 
of this work. 
A more dynamic representation of the behavior of a “2oo2” system which is a step 
closer to the real world is provided by the flowchart in Figure 3, which also takes into 
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accounts the dynamic aspects related to the error propagation and the interaction 
between the two units. Errors generated by transient (i.e. software) faults are assumed 
to remain latent for a period 1/Lt before eventually activating and generating a unit 
failure (i.e. an incorrect output), when they are not detected by the internal diagnostic 
checks. System behaviour with permanent (i.e. hardware) faults differ from the one 
described for transient faults in the following points: 1) the average latency, which is 
1/Lp; 2) the fact that a (small) class of hardware failures can be non diagnosable (that 
is, they always activate); 3) error generation from a permanent fault is continuous, 
until system shutdown. Due to the redundancy provided by system architecture, a 
single unit failure does not generate a hazardous output unless a failure occurs also in 
the exclusion logic or both units produce the same wrong output (a very rare event). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Fault Tree for the hazardous failure of the “2oo2” architecture. 
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Figure 3. The hazardous failure flow-chart. 
4. Failure model 
In this Section we describe the failure model for the MTBHE evaluation formerly 
introduced in [16]. It is obtained by translating the flow-chart shown in Figure 3 into a 
Bayesian Network. We believe that Bayesian Networks can be advantageously 
employed to address the hazardous failure modeling of “2oo2” architectures, since the 
resulting model is: 
• easier to manage and hence less error prone when performing maintenance 
(as it will be demonstrated in the rest of this section); 
• quicker to evaluate (as quantitatively demonstrated in reference [5]). 
Furthermore, the specific features of BN also allow for useful automatic analyses, like 
sensitivity to findings and most probable explanations, which are supported by most 
solving tools (e.g. Netica [23]). 
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In fact, the translation of the hazardous failure flow-chart into the Bayesian Network 
depicted in Figure 4 is quite straightforward. Events represented in the flow-chart are 
associated to random variables in the BN representing their probability of occurrence, 
while arcs of the flow-chart are transformed in corresponding arcs of the BN which 
are assigned conditional probability values associated to the related cause-effect 
relationships. This is done separately for the two units and the feasibility of the 
translation process is due to the absence of loops in the resulting network (BN are 
acyclic graphs). 
The main difference between the BN model and the GSPN model described in [2] is 
that the BN model is purely probabilistic while the GSPN model explicitly considers 
timing (and therefore state-related) properties. When timing aspects must be 
introduced in a probabilistic model, one possible way is to make some safe 
assumptions, i.e. by considering the worst-case conditions in the choice of the net 
parameters. For instance, if there is a possibility for the on-line diagnostic checks to 
detect latent errors, the safe assumption consists in neglecting such possibility: if the 
evaluation result is compliant with system safety requirements, then we can be 
satisfied with such result; otherwise, we need to refine the model. In the example, the 
refinement can be performed by means of an “off-line” analysis and prediction of the 
detection probability of the diagnostic checks during the reference time interval, 
which is 1 hour in case of the MTBHE model; the result of the analysis is finally 
embedded in the model as a plain probability. 
The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for the random variable modeling the 
occurrence of the UNSAFE_OUTPUT event is shown in Table 1. 
The parameters and the probabilities used to populate the model have been listed 
in Table 2. The reported values are fixed in this study, since they are related to 
hardware fault probabilities, design choices and measured data.  
The “2oo3” failure model can be derived from the “2oo2” model: 
MTBHE2oo3 = 1/3 · MTBHE2oo2 
In fact, the behavior of a “2oo3” system can be described by three “2oo2” systems: 
units A AND B, units B AND C, units A AND C. 
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Figure 4. The Bayesian Network model of the “2oo2” computer architecture. 
 
Table 1. The Conditional Probability Table for the UNSAFE_OUTPUT event. 
True False Same Output Alt. UNCORR_A UNCORR_B Excl_A Excl_B 
True True 
True False 
False True 
True 
False False 
True True 
1 0 
True False 
0 1 False True 
0 1 
True 
False 
False False 
1 0 True True 
0 1 True False 
1 0 False True 
True 
False False 
True True 
True False 
False True 
0 1 
True 
False 
False 
False False 
1 0 True True 
1 0 True False 
1 0 False True 
0 1 
True 
False False 
1 0 True True 
1 0 True False 
0 1 False True 
0 1 
True 
False 
False False 
1 0 True True 
0 1 True False 
1 0 False True 
0 1 
True 
False False 
True True 
True False 
False True 
0 1 
False 
False 
False 
False False 
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The model has been evaluated in order to demonstrate system compliance with safety 
requirements. For instance, reference [27] reports the safety requirements of a modern 
railway control systems (i.e. ERTMS/ETCS [26]). In this document, the THR 
requirement of 2·10-9 hazardous failures per hour is apportioned on the ground 
subsystem for one half (i.e. 10-9 HF/h), the MTBHE being obviously the inverse of the 
THR. Generally speaking, values in the order of 10-9 are common when defining 
quantitative safety requirements.  
The tool we used for model construction and evaluation is Netica [23]. The results of 
the analysis are reported in Table 2, where the last row (shaded in grey) highlights the 
main result, consisting in the evaluated Hazard Rate (HR) of the system. 
Quite obviously: 
MTBHE2oo3 =  1 / (3 · HR2oo2)= 6.9362 · 1011 h 
which is largely compliant to system safety requirements, also considered the other 
possible causes of hazardous failures. Compared with the data provided in reference 
[2], these results have served to validate our model. 
Figure 5 reports the results of an “a posteriori” probability evaluation (with the 
UNSAFE_OUTPUT event value fixed to TRUE). Such results allows engineers to 
understand which is the relative contribution of each factor to system safety without 
performing a number of sensitivity analyses: more “critical” events are simply the 
ones with the higher “a posteriori” probabilities. For instance, transient faults give a 
higher contribution (68.4%) to hazardous failures with respect to permanent faults 
(31.6%), while only the 7.6% of hazardous failures are due to non detectable faults. 
These results suggest that if an effort has to be performed in order to increase system 
safety, then it should be allocated to transient fault prevention and tolerance. 
Checking for symmetry in the results is also useful to validate the model. 
We recall that Bayesian Networks only allows for a probabilistic approach, with safe 
assumptions on fault/error latencies. Safe assumptions can be very effective in 
simplifying models; however, they usually take to a worsening of the results. As the 
analysis is aimed at fulfilling a safety-requirement given by a reference standard, the 
assumptions can be considered acceptable as long as the result is below the specified 
threshold, otherwise, the model has to be refined in order to achieve better results or a 
different modeling formalism must be employed. 
The results obtained in this Section do not account for imperfect maintenance (it is 
assumed that all the repair interventions are performed correctly), which is addressed 
in next section. 
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Table 2. Bayesian Network parameters and results. 
STOCHASTIC VAR. MEANING VALUE PROBABILITY 
Detectable_Fault_A A detectable fault occurring in Unit A True 1.5·10
-6
 
Detectable_Fault_B A detectable fault occurring in Unit B True 1.5·10
-6
 
Error_due_to_Transient_A An error due to a transient fault occurring in Unit A True 1.5·10
-6
 
Error_due_to_Transient_B An error due to a transient fault occurring in Unit B True 1.5·10
-6
 
Excl_A A failure occurring in the Exclusion Logic of Unit A True 10
-10
 
Excl_B A failure occurring in the Exclusion Logic of Unit B True 10
-10
 
Fault_A A fault occurring in Unit A True 1.6666·10-5 
Fault_B A fault occurring in Unit B True 1.6666·10-5 
Fault_detectability_A The possibility of detecting a fault occurring in Unit A Detectable 0.9 
Fault_detectability_B The possibility of detecting a fault occurring in Unit B Detectable 0.9 
Fault_type_A The fault type of Unit A (Transient or Permanent) Transient 0.9 
Fault_type_B The fault type of Unit B (Transient or Permanent) Transient 0.9 
Non_detectable_Fault_A A non detectable fault 
occurring in Unit A True 1.6666·10
-7
 
Non_detectable_Fault_B A non detectable fault 
occurring in Unit B True 1.6666·10
-7
 
Permanent_Fault_A A permanent fault occurring in Unit A True 1.6666·10
-6
 
Permanent_Fault_B A permanent fault occurring in Unit B True 1.6666·10
-6
 
Same_output_alterations 
The two units produce the 
same modification of their 
output 
True 0.1 
Transient_Fault_A A transient fault occurring in Unit A True 1.5·10
-5
 
Transient_Fault_B A transient fault occurring in Unit B True 1.5·10
-5
 
UNCORR_A An uncorrect output 
occurring in Unit A True 2.1912·10
-6
 
UNCORR_B An uncorrect output 
occurring in Unit B True 2.1912·10
-6
 
Undetected_permanent_A An undetected permanent fault occurring in Unit A True 6.9164·10
-7
 
Undetected_permanent_B An undetected permanent fault occurring in Unit B True 6.9164·10
-7
 
UNSAFE_OUTPUT An unsafe output 
occurring in the system True 4.8056·10
-13
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Figure 5. Model evaluation by means of “a posteriori” probabilities. 
5. Maintenance model 
The aim of this Section is to evaluate the impact of imperfect maintenance on system 
safety. To this aim, Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) are employed. 
In general, non state-based approaches (e.g. Bayesian Networks) feature the 
advantage of an improved efficiency over the state-based approaches (e.g. Markov 
Chains, Timed Automata, Stochastic Petri Nets) for stochastic analysis of 
dependability properties, with combinatorial approaches being the most efficient (e.g. 
Fault Trees, Reliability Block Diagrams) [5]. However, state-based approaches are 
usually needed when maintainability aspects must be explicitly taken into account 
[14]. 
From the above considerations, it is clear that when modeling safety related aspects a 
trade-off must be achieved between modeling expressiveness, solving efficiency and 
ease of use of modeling formalisms, using the most straightforward, readable, 
maintainable and quick to evaluate model which is able to fulfill the evaluation 
objectives. A similar consideration should be done when deciding the level of 
abstraction of models. This is particularly meaningful when the MTBHE model needs 
to be enriched with imperfect maintenance modeling, which is a real industrial need 
in the safety assessment process. 
Imperfect maintenance modeling must take into account: 
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• the missed substitution of the faulty section after a possibly non diagnosable 
permanent hardware fault; 
• the occurrence of permanent hardware faults during system shut-down; 
• the unwilled system restart after a loss and return of power. 
Hence, a state-based model is required and it can be built at different levels of detail, 
from four to eight states, as shown in Figure 6. In order to consider only four states, 
the modeler needs to make safe assumptions. More specifically, all permanent faults 
must be considered as non diagnosable. This obviously leads to an underestimation of 
the MTBHE. The other common assumptions are: 
1) The unsafe failure states give a negligible contribution; 
2) The most severe failure states can include less severe ones (e.g. the state with 
non diagnosable permanent faults does not exclude the presence of diagnosable 
permanent faults). 
We will describe the three models starting from the simplest and adding details for the 
more complex ones. The states of all three models are described in Table 3. 
State Extended Name Description 
S0 
SYSTEM UP WITH NO 
UNDIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT 
FAULTS 
The system is operating normally, without latent 
non diagnosable permanent faults 
S1 SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH NO PERMANENT FAULTS (POWERED) 
The system is in the safe shutdown state with no 
permanent faults accumulated 
S2 
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH A NON 
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT FAULT 
(POWERED) 
The system is in the shutdown state after a non 
diagnosable permanent faults has occurred 
S3 SYSTEM UP WITH A NON DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT FAULT 
The system is in an unsafe state with permanent 
faults which will eventually activate 
S4 SYSTEM NOT POWERED WITH A NON DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT FAULT 
The system is unpowered after at least a non 
diagnosable permanent fault has been 
accumulated 
S0′ SYSTEM UP WITH NO PERMANENT FAULTS 
The system is operating normally without latent 
permanent faults 
S0″ SYSTEM UP WITH A DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT FAULT 
The system is operating with at least a permanent 
fault which has not been detected yet 
S5 
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH A 
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT FAULT 
(POWERED) 
The same of S2 for diagnosable faults 
S6 SYSTEM NOT POWERED WITH A DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT FAULT 
The same of S4 for diagnosable faults 
Table 3. States of the imperfect maintenance model. 
The simplest model is depicted in Figure 6 (c) and it is composed of four states. The 
initial state is S0, representing normal system operation. In case of a safe shutdown, 
the system moves to state S1, while if a non diagnosable permanent fault occurs, the 
next state will be S3 (representing a hazardous state). Starting from S1, it is possible to 
reach S2 if a non diagnosable error occurs or to return back to S0 whereas a 
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maintenance intervention has been performed to restore the system. System can move 
from S2 to S0 in case of correct maintenance or to S3 in case of loss and return of 
power. Finally, moving from S3 to S2 is allowed by a safe shutdown (e.g. caused by 
another diagnosed error). 
The “intermediate” model of Figure 6 (b) introduces a new state (S4) which can be 
reached from S3 and S2 whereas a loss of power occurs (when the power is restored, 
system returns to S3). 
The most complex model of Figure 6 (a) adds the following features: 
• partitioning of S0 state in two states (S0′ and S0″) which better highlight the 
effect of error detection latency on diagnosable faults; 
• introduction of two states S5 and S6 modeling the same dynamics of S2 and 
S3 for diagnosable permanent faults. 
As an aside, please note that the transitions between states can be classified into two 
main categories: in the first we can list the ones related to inner and non-human 
factors (e.g. system shutdowns in case of failures); the second comprises outer and 
human factors (e.g. incorrect repairs or ungoverned start-ups after a power restore). 
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SYSTEM UP WITH NO
PERMANENT FAULTS
SYSTEM NOT POWERED
WITH A DIAGNOSABLE
PERMANENT FAULT
Safe shutdow n due
to a diagnosable
permanent fault
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH NO
PERMANENT FAULTS
(POWERED)
Safe shutdown
due to a diagnosable
transient fault
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH A NON
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT (POWERED)
Non diagnosable
permanent fault
SYSTEM UP WITH A
DIAGNOSABLE
PERMANENT FAULT
System restart due
to a return of power
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH A
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT (POWERED)
Diagnosable
permanent fault
SYSTEM NOT POWERED
WITH A NON DIAGNOSABLE
PERMANENT FAULT
Non diagnosable permanent fault
System restart
Loss of power
SYSTEM UP WITH A NON
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT
System Restart due to a
return of power
Loss of
power
Incorrect
maintenance
Incorrect
maintenanceCorrect
maintenance
Correc t
maintenanceSafe shutdown
due to a diagnosable
transient or permanent fault
Safe shutdown
due to a diagnosable
transient or permanent fault
Non diagnosable permanent fault
Diagnosable permanent fault
Loss of power
(a) 
  
SYSTEM UP WITH NO
UNDIAGNOSABLE
PERMANENT FAULTS
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH NO
PERMANENT FAULTS
(POWERED)
Safe shutdow n
due to a diagnosed fault
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH A NON
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT (POWERED) Non diagnosable
permanent fault
System restart due
to a return of pow er
SYSTEM NOT POWERED
WITH A NON DIAGNOSABLE
PERMANENT FAULT
System restart
Loss of power
SYSTEM UP WITH A NON
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT
Incorrect
maintenance
Correct
maintenance
Safe shutdow n
due to a diagnosable
transient or permanent fault
 Transient or Permanent
Diagnosable faults
Non diagnosable
permanent fault
Loss of power
 
(b) 
SYSTEM UP WITH NO
UNDIAGNOSABLE
PERMANENT FAULTS
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH NO
PERMANENT FAULTS
(POWERED)
Safe shutdown
due to a diagnosed fault
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN WITH A NON
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT (POWERED) Non diagnosable
permanent fault
(SAFE: any fault)
System res tart
Loss and return
of power
SYSTEM UP WITH A NON
DIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT
FAULT
Incorrect
maintenance
Correct
maintenanceSafe shutdow ndue to a diagnosed
fault
 Transient or Permanent
Diagnosable faults
Non diagnosable
permanent fault
(SAFE: any fault)
(c) 
Figure 6. State-based maintenance models at different levels of detail. 
A new modeling approach to the safety evaluation of N-modular redundant computer systems in presence of imperfect maintenance      16 
6. A multiformalism model combining failure and maintenance 
models 
The failure and maintenance models presented in the previous Sections may be 
developed and updated independently, but they can be composed and solved jointly in 
order to describe and analyze the real working system in presence of imperfect 
maintenance.  
To this aim a multiformalism approach is needed since the two models are described 
by different modeling languages. The use of multiformalism techniques is very 
appealing in modeling complex systems as they allow operating on each aspect of 
interest by using the most appropriate modeling language and the best available 
solution technique [25]. While a single highly expressive formalism (e.g. GSPN) can 
always be employed in order to design the entire model, this would imply a poorly 
manageable model, which is more difficult to understand and validate, and harder to 
solve as a whole, due to the state-space explosion phenomenon. 
Here we combine the failure and maintenance models applying the OsMoSys 
Modeling Methodology (OMM) [28], which is based on object orientation and 
metamodeling concepts. According to OMM, each model is an instance of its Model 
Class. A Model Class defines the structure of a model expressed by a specified 
formalism, the parameters that must be provided when instancing objects, and the 
interface of the model, that is the elements of the model used to interact with other 
models. The interaction is defined and implemented by means of proper composition 
operators. Hence, in the following the failure model and the maintenance model are 
two Model Classes (FM and MM respectively). Let us assume that FM is the BN 
model described in Section 4 and MM is the model of Figure 6 (b); their parameters 
are listed in the following. 
FM MODEL CLASS: 
• PAR1: the fault probability of a single unit; 
• PAR2: the ratio of the probability of non diagnosable faults (in both units); 
• PAR3: the probability of two simultaneous faults producing identical outputs; 
MM MODEL CLASS: 
• PAR4: probability of occurrence of an error in one of the two units (leading 
to system safe shutdown); 
• PAR5: UNSAFE_OUTPUT (the HFR of the “2oo2” system); 
• PAR6: inverse of Mean Time to Repair (MTTR); 
• PAR7: ratio of wrong maintenance interventions; 
• PAR8: inverse of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of the power line; 
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• PAR9: inverse of the Mean Time To Restore (MTTRS) of the power line. 
In the following we clarify the relationships between the above parameters and the 
CTMC models: 
• the safe shutdown parameter, that is the probability of the transition from S0 
to S1 and from S3 to S2, is calculated as 2*PAR4-PAR5. This is due to the fact 
that a safe shutdown occurs every time at least one unit fails (PAR4 for two 
units) except the time when an unsafe shutdown occurs (PAR5); 
• the unsafe shutdown parameter (transition probability from S1 to S2 and from 
S0 to S3) is simply PAR5; 
• the system restart parameter (transition from S1 to S0) is PAR6; 
• the incorrect maintenance parameter (transition from S2 to S0) is PAR6 * 
PAR7, while the correct one (transition from S2 to S3) is (1 - PAR7) * PAR6; 
• the transition to S4, representing the loss of power, has probability PAR8; 
• the transition from S3 to S4, representing the spontaneous restore of power, 
has probability PAR9; 
• the output of the model is the steady-state probability of S3 which is 
represented by PAR10. 
In order to perform the analysis, one object φ of FM and one object µ of MM must be 
instantiated specifying the values of their parameters. Nevertheless, PAR4 and PAR5 
may be obtained by solving a failure model. Hence, φ  can be instantiated, but  µ  is 
fully instantiated only after the results of the failure model are available. This is a 
simple example of sequential composition, in which the interfaces of FM and MM 
contain the parameters PAR4 and PAR5, (output and input parameters, respectively). 
The composition operator used to  combine the two models specifies that φ  has to be 
solved and that the results represented by PAR4 and PAR5 must be used to instantiate 
µ.
 
This situation is depicted in Figure 7, in which PAR10 is the steady state probability 
of the system being in the state “UP WITH UNDIAGNOSABLE PERMANENT 
FAULTS”, which is obtained by solving µ. 
 
Figure 7. Composition of failure and maintenance models. 
If we instantiate φ  with the values: 
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PAR1 = 1.666·10-5, PAR2 = 10-1, PAR3 = 10-1 
the solution of the failure model produces the following results: 
PAR4 = 2.19·10-6, PAR5 = 4.8·10-13. 
Assuming that: 
PAR6 = 1, PAR7 = 10-2, PAR8 = 10-4, PAR9 = 3 
and solving the maintenance model µ, we obtain that the HFR of the “2oo3” is 
3.33·10-7, which is greater than the required 10-9. 
Sensitivity analyses can help to understand how to achieve better results. For 
example: 
1) reducing PAR2 by a factor of 10, there are negligible variations of the results; 
2) reducing PAR1 by a factor of 10, PAR4 is reduced by a factor of 10 and 
PAR5 is reduced by a factor of 100; 
3) reducing PAR3 by a factor of 10, PAR4 remains unchanged while PAR5 is 
reduced by a factor of 10. 
The results of the second analysis highlight that the model is not much sensible to 
variations of PAR6, PAR7, PAR8 and PAR9, while it is very sensible to variations of 
PAR4 and PAR5. In particular, acceptable results can be achieved only if PAR4 is high 
and PAR5 is low. 
Considering the following parameters: 
PAR1 = 10-5, PAR2 = 10-1, PAR3 = 3·10-4 
the analysis of the BN model leads to the following results: 
PAR4 = 1.3·10-6, PAR5 = 7.81·10-16 
and the analysis of the Markov model leads to: 
HFR2oo3 = 9.1·10-10. 
This is an acceptable result, considered that the choice PAR3 = 3·10-4 is justified by 
the fact that the probability of identical erroneous outputs is actually much lower [9]. 
More sophisticated compositions may be addressed by adopting a multiformalism 
modeling approach. Figure 8 shows a general scheme where the model interfaces and 
the composition operator are explicitly represented. As aforementioned, the choice of 
the models is related to the objectives of the evaluation. 
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Figure 8. Multiformalism multilevel modeling. 
 
Indeed, Figure 8 provides a generalization of the case-study analyzed above: the 
adopted multiformalism methodology provides the mechanisms by which multiple 
Model Classes may implement the same interface. This makes it possible to easily 
change, for example, the BN model with a GSPN or a FT version of the failure model, 
if needed, provided that they implement the same interface (in the specific case, if the 
parameters PAR4 e PAR5 can be obtained by solving the GSPN or the FT models). 
The same holds for the CTMC maintenance model: Figure 8 highlights the possibility 
of choice among the three models described in Section 5. The possibility of model 
reuse and the flexibility of analysis provided by a multiformalism approach reveals to 
be very useful when customizations of the failure or maintenance models are needed 
(e.g. to fit different installations of the system). Furthermore, it could happen that the 
maintenance model is provided by the customer, who manages the repair policies, 
while the failure model is managed by the supplier, who knows the details of the 
system architecture. 
Operators are used to connect submodels and carry information about the composition 
semantics. OMM distinguishes two kinds of operators: operators implying model 
manipulation, and operators which require the evaluation of results from submodels in 
order to instantiate or modify other submodels. The operator used above to combine 
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the failure and the maintenance models belongs to the second category. Nevertheless 
different composition semantics (i.e. different integration policies) between the failure 
and the maintenance models are possible. For example, the two model classes could 
be coupled in a ways such that if in the failure model the shutdown event is activated, 
then the maintenance model switches to the system shutdown state, and when the 
failure model is in system shutdown state, only permanent hardware faults can happen 
in the failure model. The overall composed model must then be solved as a whole. 
Again, if the result of the evaluation is compliant with the requirement, then model 
choice can be considered as satisfactory, otherwise more refined models/formalisms 
must be adopted (a priority based on readability or solving efficiency could be defined 
in order to guide the choice of the sub-model to be refined). If the safety requirement 
is not demonstrated to be fulfilled even with the most complicated model, then some 
of the design or maintenance parameters need to be changed. 
The analysis of complex OMM models can be automated by means of the OsMoSys 
Multisolution Framework (OMF) [17]. The OMF has been developed to provide the 
support needed to a loosely coupled cooperation among heterogeneous analysis 
techniques and tools. In other words, it automates the tasks that must be performed to 
solve complex multiformalism models. “Multisolution” in OsMoSys means solving a 
composed model according to a well defined solution process. The solution process 
usually involves the execution of more solution or analysis tools (solvers). The 
execution order of the solvers and the data dependencies among them are defined by 
the solution process, which is described by means of a workflow language. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have introduced a new approach to model N-modular redundant 
computer systems used in safety-critical control applications. The results we have 
obtained support the use of different formalisms for an easy and effective 
representation of the hazardous failure model. In particular, the issue of evaluating the 
impact of imperfect maintenance on system safety has been addressed by solving a 
multiformalism compositional model including a Bayesian Network failure model and 
a Continuous Time Markov Chain maintenance model. The mutiformalism approach 
could appear more complex with respect to one based on a single formalism. 
However, our experience has demonstrated that many classes of modeling problems 
(like the one described in this paper) are far better managed using “divide et impera” 
approaches, based on modular and incremental techniques (see e.g. [30]). A user-
friendly support framework (OMF [17]) has been engineered to the scope, and it is 
currently under development, with the aim of hiding to the modeler the complexity of 
the solving process.  
The choice of modeling formalism we have performed seems to fit well the case-
study presented in this paper. However, it is always useful to explore further 
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combinations of formalisms in order to enhance efficiency and ease of modeling 
when dealing with the same or different problems. For instance, basing on different 
assumptions, it is possible to employ Repairable Fault Trees [10] and/or Dynamic 
Bayesian Networks [21] (allowing to explicitly model state-base aspects). Both 
formalisms implement an implicit multiformalism paradigm which can be managed in 
the OsMoSys framework. Implicit multiformalism allows solving models using 
different formalisms while presenting to the modeler a single and possibly 
straightforward formalism. Furthermore, the solving process can be such to optimize 
efficiency. In the case of RFT, this is performed by using combinatorial techniques 
(i.e. Fault Tree) on non repairable tree branches and state-based techniques (i.e. 
GSPN) on repairable ones. Another way to improve efficiency is to recognize and 
exploit model symmetries (e.g. tree branches sharing the same structure) and “fold” 
them by means of a colored class of Petri Nets, e.g. Stochastic Well-formed Nets [8]. 
As mentioned in Section 6, a cohesive model which is more adherent to reality allows 
for less conservative assumptions, with the result of a better optimization of design 
parameters. Therefore, the OMM [17] is going to be extended with new and more 
sophisticated composition operators, allowing for a strictly coupled interaction 
between models (based on state or action sharing),  
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